Abstract

How can private reproductive labor be socialized under socialism? The text analyzes the political, cultural, and structural particularities of private reproductive labor and shows how labor-time calculation could serve as a tool to recognize it economically and, consequently, politically.

Introduction to Labor-Time Calculation

Labor-time calculation, as developed by the “Group of International Communists” (GIC) in 1930, describes a model of council-democratic socialization in which social production and distribution are measured not by money, but by labor time. One hour of work is compensated as one hour, regardless of the type of activity performed. No work is valued higher or lower than another, because differences in compensation—however plausible they may seem at first glance—inevitably create means for inequality and oppression in a society with existing power and discrimination structures. The reflections of the American social scientist Robin Hahnel on his participatory planned economy (Parecon), for example, may sound fair at first: work should be compensated according to time, effort, and exertion.¹ However, in a society still permeated by deeply discriminatory structures (e.g., racism, patriarchy, queerphobia, ableism), even a radically democratic decision on compensation can quickly lead to certain activities being devalued². In today’s economic liberalism, it is claimed that high salaries are justified by special responsibilities. Yet a preschool teacher who, after the absence of colleagues, must ensure that none of twenty-five children comes to harm “earns” very little for this. Such evaluations are not only expressions of capitalist interests but also reveal how deeply unequal social standards of value are embedded in the perception of work. Only when every hour of work is considered equivalent can it be prevented that people are pushed into material dependence and social inequality through their activities.

Production in the labor-time calculation model is based on the self-organization of workers. For the work performed, producers receive certificates (hereafter “labor certificates”) corresponding to their individual share of labor time. With these labor certificates, workers can consume goods and services in a so-called “productive sector.” In addition, there is a “public sector,” where goods and services are freely available to all people without the need for labor certificates.³ Whether something belongs to the public or the productive sector (e.g. education, health care, mobility) is decided democratically. The public sector may not consume more labor, raw materials, and means of production than are produced in the productive sector. This balance forms the basis of economic—and thus social—stability. The “individual consumption factor” (FIC) expresses mathematically the share of total labor that society allocates to the public sector. The larger the public sector, the lower the hourly value of the labor certificate. This means that for one hour of work performed, I receive correspondingly less labor time on my certificate, as determined by the FIC. If the FIC is, for example, 0.5, I receive only half a certificate for one hour of work. The portion deducted from my worked hour represents, in accounting terms, the collective “taking according to need” through the public sector.

Discrimination and Marginalization in Reproductive Labor

In the following, several forms of private reproductive labor are described by way of example in order to illustrate an economic and political problem. Some forms of private reproductive labor are obvious, such as caring for relatives in need of care or the supervision of young children.

For the sake of simplification, the subject of private reproductive labor can perhaps be divided into two fields of conflict: as a special form of labor organization under capitalism (socially necessary, yet rendered invisible and unpaid), and as a symptom of discrimination primarily affecting people with a female social identity. Paid work in the care and education sectors is also part of the low-wage sector in Germany, in which women are predominantly employed.⁴ Women, trans, and non-binary people are still largely financially worse off than men⁵ or are even dependent on them, are more likely to fall into old-age poverty, and therefore have to work more (especially when paid and unpaid work are added together). As a result, they also have less time for political struggle.

In response to the ongoing material and social discrimination of women and gender-nonconforming people, the vision has grown for decades to continuously relativize heteronormative gender identities and thereby further dissolve the attribution of care, nurturing, compassion, etc., as exclusively female social roles. While men can also perform reproductive labor at home, the decision to do so is made more difficult by the fact that families face the reality of relying on men’s generally higher income. After nine months of pregnancy and the intensive bonding with the newborn (still almost sacralized in parenting forums and guides), it is often taken for granted that the mother will assume the caregiving. Recovery takes time, and (re)entry into paid employment is often not possible for an extended period. Physical and psychological complications may arise after pregnancy, such as postpartum depression. An infant relies on a primary caregiver who must be available almost continuously, while the person who gave birth is in a phase of physical recovery. Such circumstances very often lead the birthing parent to capitulate to the situation, taking on most of the reproductive tasks at first, but gradually becoming deeply embedded in them. It thus appears as if women (and all people with female socialization) take on these tasks almost naturally, even though they are continuously imposed by their physical, material, and social circumstances. Whether children are born or not is of interest to the state, but the exhausting labor involved is perceived as “private” and voluntary.⁶ Raising a child is immediately meaningful and, at the same time, culturally so idealized that many people still find it difficult to call it work.

Expectations of Socialism

In the labor-time calculation model, where everyone is compensated equally, no dependence remains on who performs the work at home. Workplace safety and working conditions in general could be significantly improved through workplace self-management. This opens broader access to different areas of work, allowing people to switch between various activities depending on their current needs, rather than being tied to a single occupation for most of their lives. There are ideas for collectively organized neighborhoods intended to overcome the isolation of the nuclear family. Access to food, cleaning, and care could be organized more easily through collective services, thereby relieving people engaged in care work.⁷ Forms of reproductive labor that cannot be institutionalized even in contemporary socialist visions should still be examined for possibilities of economic recognition.

For example, as soon as a trip to the playground with a child is considered socially necessary work, it can be accounted for in the labor-time calculation model.⁸ However, until such decisions are made collectively, significant conflicts are to be expected, because the exclusion, delegitimization, ignorance, and devaluation of this work are deeply embedded in patriarchal power structures. The phenomenon of “mental load” only became visible when the one-sided, continuously empathetic thinking for others was experienced as so burdensome that those affected introduced a term of their own to describe the experience.

So far, there are too few surveys and political discussions on what those involved in private care work actually consider to be work. This may also be because these activities have long ceased to be seriously discussed as deserving of compensation at all. The Federal Time Use Survey (TUS), which attempts every ten years to record how people allocate their time to paid and unpaid work, leisure, and education, at least provides some statistics.⁹ Such approaches are very important for initiating the discussion. Once the remuneration of private reproductive labor is seriously considered, a comprehensive and ongoing political negotiation process could begin.

Labor Certificates for Private Reproductive Labor

How do patterns of consumption change, and which economic dynamics and decisions come into play when we begin to remunerate private reproductive labor? The demand for “wages for housework,” formulated by Mariarosa Dalla Costa (1972), is still described as illusory in contemporary left-wing debates.¹⁰ On the one hand, this is because no surplus value can be extracted from the remuneration of housework, meaning that such demands cannot be raised within capitalism. On the other hand, it is argued that introducing remuneration would generate a large increase in consumption claims and thus trigger inflation. If we assume that capitalist relations have been abolished and production is organized around social needs rather than profit, unnecessary forms of work would disappear and new productive forces would be freed up. These are already more favorable conditions. Nevertheless, within a model of labor-time calculation, we still need to examine economic dynamics such as inflation more closely.

The public sector provides goods and services free of charge. Within the logic of labor-time calculation, private reproductive labor would belong to the public sector, since no labor certificates are required for it to be consumed. Remunerating it nonetheless would, in concrete terms, create a comparatively large new share of consumption claims in the form of labor certificates.¹¹ If private reproductive labor is now remunerated, goods become “more expensive,” because the share paid out to me in the form of certificates decreases. At least in the initial phase of this transition, I would therefore have to work more in order to consume goods from the productive sector.¹²

Through a public accounting system that transparently tracks all economic processes, and with the help of the FIC, a society can rationally plan and assess how the total societal workload would need to change if we decide to remunerate specific forms of reproductive labor, in order to maintain economic stability. In our case, the main effect is a theoretical shift in the societal allocation of consumption claims: those performing reproductive labor receive direct remuneration—negotiated transparently—whereas previously their claims were only covered indirectly through others’ incomes or state benefits. Political discussions about recognizing reproductive labor can then be conducted in a detailed and fact-based manner, as all workers can see the potential effects of remunerating certain types of private reproductive labor on overall economic development. It is to be expected that some people may choose not to reduce their own consumption claims in order to allow for the remuneration of private reproductive labor—but this is precisely the political struggle that must be undertaken.

Another way to remunerate reproductive labor would be through flat rates, which may be easier to represent in accounting than individual hourly records. These rates could cover work that has been measured on average, and whose temporal validity (possibly in different gradations) could be collectively agreed upon. However, any flat rate first needs to be carefully justified and developed. To gather the necessary data and material, a process would have to be initiated in which people consistently record the hours they define as work over a longer period and exchange information about their experiences.¹³

For a change, a thought experiment

Suppose that producing bicycles wasn’t simply possible in a factory and that all bicycles were always freely available because, for cultural reasons, men had long produced them privately for society alongside their paid work. In other words, we have always effectively received our bicycles for free. The men, for example, build these bicycles by studying the plans on their way home from work and discussing them with other men. At home, they continue working on the bicycles, overburdened. Their partners watch anxiously, desperately hand over a few tools, and occasionally rearrange appointments to help out. Many men suffer from this double burden, require psychological treatment, cannot work as much, and consequently become dependent on their partners. At some point, they demand: “Can’t others also produce the bicycles, or can we finally receive some realistic economic recognition for this important work we’ve been doing for free for so long—maybe in the form of consumption claims? After all, society as a whole needs bicycles!” How would we respond? Would we say: “How unrealistic! Who is going to produce all the goods you suddenly want with consumption claims? We’d rather give you a few more of ours and leave it at that! Bicycle building has always been in your nature—what even counts as ‘work’? Should greasing chains suddenly be considered work when you’ve done it your whole life, sometimes without any training? Besides, there’s so much joy and fulfillment in building bicycles—you think about nothing else! It’s very intimate and none of society’s business. If necessary, we can offer some compensation to make bicycle building easier for you, such as a flat rate, a small allowance, or someone bringing you food and cleaning your workshop. But that’s it—someone has to pay for it!” This response is understandable to some extent, but it’s also easy to see why the bicycle builders might reject it.

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